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SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION:
ATTRIBUTION UNDER THE
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT IN OBB PERSONENVERKEHR
AG V. SACHS
DANIEL R. ECHEVERRI*
INTRODUCTION
In 1810, Napoleon captured an American ship, strapped arms to it,
and absorbed it into the French naval fleet. When two American
citizens sought to recover the vessel, a unanimous Court relied on
customary international law and held France, as a foreign sovereign,
1
was exempt from suit. Since then, foreign sovereign immunity has
been a staple of both American common law and international law.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) is the modern
2
United States law.
3
Foreign sovereigns are generally immune from suit. Recently, the
4
commercial-activity exception has become a significant point of
5
contention in the federal courts. This exception allows a foreign
sovereign to be sued in cases where “the action is based upon a

* J.D. and LL.M. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146–47 (1812) (holding that
foreign sovereign immunity, as exemplified in customary international law, applied to a vessel
owned by American citizens that was seized by the French military and removed the former
owners’ claim over the ship).
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602–11 (2012).
3. Id. § 1604; but see id. §§ 1605–1605A (establishing exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity).
4. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
5. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (holding a contract with an
instrumentality of a foreign sovereign is insufficient to satisfy the exception); Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding a foreign sovereign is not liable under
the exception when it regulates foreign currency exchange); Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429
F.3d 288 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding a ticket sale by a third party in the United States is sufficient
to satisfy the commercial-activity exception); Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)
(same).
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commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
6
state.” However, courts still wrestle with two key issues: first, what
7
makes a claim “based upon” a commercial activity ; and second, when
are actions of non-sovereign entities attributable to foreign
8
sovereigns. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs addresses these two
9
questions.
This commentary will detail the facts of the case and then proceed
with the legal background of foreign sovereign immunity. Next, it will
outline the Ninth Circuit’s en banc holding. Then it will relate each
party’s arguments regarding the two issues on appeal. Finally, after
analyzing the competing arguments, it concludes that the Supreme
Court will likely reverse the lower court, holding that although the
claim is “based upon” a commercial activity, the commercial activity
of a separate entity cannot be imputed to the foreign state. OBB is
immune under FSIA.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
OBB, as a national rail service, operates solely within the Republic
10
of Austria. It is an “agency or instrumentality” of Austria and
11
therefore constitutes “a sovereign state” under FSIA. Along with
other European rail services, OBB is a member of the Eurail Group,
12
an association organized under Luxembourg law. The Eurail Group
13
markets and sells rail passes for these European rail services,

6. § 1605(a)(2).
7. Compare Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 292 (“establish[ing] a fact without which the plaintiff
will lose” will suffice for the “based upon” requirement) with Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505
F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding the “based upon” requirement is satisfied when a “degree
of closeness” exists “between the commercial activity and the gravamen of the plaintiff’s
complaint”).
8. Compare First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec),
462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (holding a foreign sovereign can be liable for actions performed by a
state-owned corporation only when the entity is “so extensively controlled by its owner that a
relationship of principal and agent is created” or when blindly recognizing separate legal status
“would work fraud or injustice”) (citations omitted) with Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 290 (holding that
a ticket sale performed by a travel agency in the United States for a foreign sovereign’s stateowned airline is considered a commercial activity in order to trigger liability under
§ 1605(a)(2)).
9. 135 S. Ct. 1172 (2015).
10. Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert granted
sub nom. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S. Ct. 1172 (2015).
11. Id. at 591; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)–(b) (2012).
12. Sachs, 737 F.3d at 587.
13. Id.
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14

sometimes using third-party sales agents. One such agent is Rail Pass
15
Experts (“RPE”), a Massachusetts-based company. OBB is not
involved in the day-to-day operations of either the Eurail Group or
16
RPE.
In March 2007, Plaintiff Carol Sachs bought a Eurail pass from
RPE’s website to travel in Austria and the Czech Republic on an
17
OBB train. In April, when Sachs tried to board the train, she fell
18
onto the tracks while the train was moving, crushing her legs. A year
later, Sachs filed suit against OBB, OBB Holding, and the Republic of
19
Austria. Plaintiff alleged five causes of action: negligence, design
defect, failure to warn, breach of implied warranty of merchantability,
20
and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The district court for the
Northern District of California dismissed the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, ruling that Sachs did not sufficiently show that
21
OBB was liable under the commercial-activity exception. Sachs then
22
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
23
A divided three-judge panel affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.
On rehearing en banc, the majority reversed the panel’s decision.
OBB subsequently filed for a writ of certiorari to the United States
24
Supreme Court, which the Court granted on January 23, 2015.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Foreign sovereign immunity first emerged in The Schooner
25
Exchange v. McFaddon. Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Marshall looked to customary international law to determine

14. Brief for Petitioner at 11, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S. Apr.
17, 2015).
15. Sachs, 737 F.3d at 587.
16. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 11; see Brief for Respondent at 4–5, OBB
Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S. June 29, 2015).
17. Sachs, 737 F.3d at 587.
18. Id. at 588.
19. Id. The Republic of Austria was dismissed from the suit after Sachs failed to oppose its
motion to dismiss. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 135 S. Ct. 1172 (2015).
25. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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26

the scope of foreign sovereign immunity. The Court found three
examples of cases where sovereign immunity arises: cases involving
27
28
foreign sovereign officials, cases involving foreign ambassadors, and
cases in which the domestic country allows a foreign military to enter
29
its territory. The third example applied to The Schooner Exchange
because the ship was a part of the French naval fleet when the suit
30
began. Marshall concluded this immunity is a reasonable legal rule
under international comity; questions of whether a foreign sovereign
may be subject to suit are “questions of policy [rather] than of law . . .
31
[and] they are diplomatic, rather than legal discussion[s].”
After The Schooner Exchange, a two-step process determined
32
foreign sovereign immunity. A sovereign could “request a
‘suggestion of immunity’ from the State Department,” which the
33
executive branch would grant if prudent. If the sovereign failed to
request the suggestion from the State Department, or if the State
Department denied a request, a court could nonetheless decide if
34
immunity existed. The court would determine “whether the ground
of immunity is one which it is the established policy of the [State
35
Department] to recognize.”
Initially, the State Department encouraged courts to grant
36
immunity to all “friendly foreign sovereigns.” However, in 1952, the
State Department changed course and embraced the “restrictive
37
theory of sovereign immunity.” Under the restrictive theory, “a state
is immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its sovereign or
26. Id. at 136–46 (“In exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if any, aids from precedents or
written law, the [C]ourt has found it necessary to rely much on general principles, and on a train
of reasoning founded on cases in some degree analogous to this.”).
27. Id. at 137. This is the general principle of foreign official immunity, which is not
included in the FSIA. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010).
28. Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 138.
29. Id. at 139.
30. Id. at 118.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311 (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587–89
(1943)).
33. Id. (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 312 (quoting Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)) (alterations
in original).
36. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (recounting the
history of the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine).
37. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 Dep’t of State Bull. 984–85
(1952).
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public acts (jure imperii), but not as to those that are private or
38
commercial in character (jure gestionis).” In other words, rather than
allowing its allies absolute immunity as it had before, the United
States shifted to a policy of allowing immunity for sovereign acts
39
(such as policing and imprisonment) but not for commercial acts
40
(such as advertising for a cultural tour).
B. FSIA Emerges
Congress enacted FSIA for “two well-recognized and related
purposes”: (1) “adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign
immunity” and (2) “codification of international law at the time of the
41
FSIA’s enactment.” The Act established “a comprehensive set of
legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action
against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies or
42
instrumentalities” to determine foreign sovereign immunity.
43
FSIA grants immunity for all foreign sovereigns, unless the case
falls under an exception, the most significant of which is the
44
commercial-activity exception. This exception reads:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case—
....
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an
act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
45
that act causes a direct effect in the United States[.]

Looking to nature rather than purpose, the Act defines
“commercial activity” as “a regular course of commercial conduct or a
46
particular commercial transaction or act.” Furthermore, FSIA

38. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359–60 (1993) (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487).
39. Id. at 361.
40. See Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000).
41. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193,
199 (2007).
42. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
43. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
44. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
46. Id. § 1603(d).
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defines “commercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign state” as a commercial activity that (1) is “carried on by such
47
state” and (2) has “substantial contact with the United States.”
Under FSIA, an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”
48
satisfies the definition of a “foreign state.” An “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” must be (1) “a separate legal
person, corporate or otherwise”; (2) “an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof”; and (3) “neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . ,
49
nor created under the laws of any third country.”
C. The “Based Upon” Requirement of the Commercial-Activity
Exception
The Supreme Court has held that a claim is “based upon” a
commercial activity for purposes of § 1605(a)(2) where the
commercial activity is part of “those elements of a claim that, if
proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the
50
case.” This does not mean that “each and every element of a claim
51
[must] be commercial activity by a foreign state.” Rather, the claim is
not based upon the commercial activity if such activity has nothing to
do with the action. For example, an airplane lease cannot be the basis
for a tort claim that does not assert “any rights under the lease as a
52
third party beneficiary or otherwise” related to the contract. Exactly
how close the commercial activity must be to the claim is an open
53
question among the circuit courts. Some courts have held that a
claim is based upon a commercial activity “so long as the alleged
commercial activity establishes a fact without which the plaintiff will
54
lose.” Others have held that a claim is only based upon the
commercial activity “when there exists ‘a degree of closeness’

47. Id. § 1603(e).
48. Id. § 1603(a).
49. Id. § 1603(b).
50. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993).
51. Id. at 358 n.4.
52. Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1991).
53. Compare Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005) with EM
Ltd. v. Banco Central de la República Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 97 (2d Cir. 2015).
54. Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 292 (emphasis added).
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between the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint and the commercial
55
activities engaged in by the foreign state or instrumentality.”
D. Attribution and Agency under the Commercial-Activity Exception
Foreign sovereigns often use third parties instead of directly
engaging in commercial activity. This complicates the determination
of what qualifies as a commercial activity “by a foreign state.” In these
situations, the question is whether a court can attribute actions of
entities or persons not considered part of the foreign state to the state
56
for liability. Circuit courts have either followed the Court’s holding
in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
57
58
Cuba (“Bancec”) or applied common law principles of agency.
In Bancec, the Court held that although government
instrumentalities should be treated as unique entities separate from
59
the sovereign,
traditional corporate law principles support
60
overcoming this presumption in two circumstances. First, when the
entity is “so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of
61
principal and agent is created.” Second, “when to [blindly] do so
62
would work fraud or injustice.”
On the other hand, traditional agency law principles hold that an
agency relationship exists when two parties consent to such a
63
relationship. This association does not hinge solely on the intent of
64
the parties; so long as there is an agreement, the relationship exists.
Furthermore, when an agent has more than one principal, it may, “in
any particular matter, act as an agent on behalf of only one principal,”
65
provided all the principals consent to the multiple relationships.
The Supreme Court addressed attribution under FSIA in two
66
other recent cases. In Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, several chemical
companies, which were once partially owned by Israeli state-owned
55. EM, 800 F.3d at 97 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
56. See Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of China, 822 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1987).
57. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
58. Compare Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 1992) with
Kirkham, 429 F.3d at 292.
59. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983).
60. Id. at 629.
61. Id. (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402–04 (1960)).
62. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939)).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).
64. Id. at cmt. b.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.14, cmt. b (2006).
66. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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companies, tried to claim sovereign immunity as instrumentalities of
Israel. The Court rejected this argument because it would “ignore
corporate formalities and use the colloquial sense of [the] term
67
[ownership].” Mere subsidiaries “of an instrumentality [are] not
68
[themselves] entitled to instrumentality status” under FSIA.
69
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the ex-Prime Minister of Somalia claimed
FSIA applied to him as a former official of the foreign sovereign
through the definition of “agency or instrumentality of a foreign
70
state.” The Court rejected this argument, stating that although “[the
proposed] interpretation is literally possible, [the] analysis of the
entire statutory text persuades [the Court] that [this] reading is not
71
the meaning that Congress enacted.” The Court held that, because
the definitional statute “refers to an organization, rather than an
72
individual,” “an official acting on behalf of the foreign state” cannot
be considered an “agency or instrumentality” for the purposes of
73
foreign sovereign immunity.
III. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held OBB liable under the
74
commercial-activity exception of FSIA.
The court first addressed whether RPE’s ticket sale to Sachs could
be attributed to OBB and therefore considered “commercial activity
carried on in the United States by the foreign state” under the
75
commercial-activity exception. The majority rejected OBB’s
argument that an agent must first satisfy the definition of “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) before
76
applying common law principles of agency. The court found that the
definitional statute had nothing to do with the question of attributing
77
RPE’s actions to OBB. The court reasoned that the definition of
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” determines “what type

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 474.
Id. at 473.
560 U.S. 305 (2010).
Id. at 309.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 319.
Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 603 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
Id.
Id. at 595.
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of entity can be considered a foreign state for purposes of claiming
78
79
sovereign immunity” and does not determine attribution.
The court looked to traditional agency law principles to determine
80
if there was a relationship between OBB and RPE. Because the
Eurail Group sells tickets for OBB and because Eurail uses subagents
for some of these sales, the majority found that “Eurail Group’s use of
these subagents establishes a legal relationship between OBB (the
81
principal) and RPE (the subagent).” Consequently, the majority
found that RPE’s ticket sale to Sachs could be attributed to OBB
82
through the Eurail Group. Thus, OBB “carried on commercial
83
activity in the United States.”
The court then focused on “whether the claims of Sachs are ‘based
upon’ this commercial activity” or on her injuries that occurred in
84
Austria. The court held the “based upon” requirement is satisfied “if
an element of [her] claim consists in conduct that occurred in
85
commercial activity carried on in the United States.” Furthermore,
the majority considered each of Sachs’s five claims and found them all
86
based upon OBB’s commercial activity.
Accordingly, because the court found Sachs’s claims to be based
upon commercial activity and that RPE’s ticket sale in the United
States could be attributed to OBB based on common-law principles
of agency, the Ninth Circuit reversed and reinstated all five of Sachs’s
87
claims.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. OBB’s Arguments
First, OBB argues the “based upon” requirement of the
commercial-activity exception refers to the gravamen of the
complaint, and therefore Sachs’s claims fail because they are “based

78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1460 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995)).
80. Id. at 593.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
84. Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 599 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
85. Id. (quoting Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original)
(emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 602 (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 603.
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upon” the accident in Austria, not any commercial activity in the
88
United States. Second, OBB then claims that even if the ticket sale
was commercial activity, it was not performed “by the foreign state”
because RPE cannot be considered an agency of Austria under either
89
FSIA’s definition of “agency or instrumentality,” or the Supreme
90
Court’s decision in Bancec. OBB submits the Court should reverse
91
the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
1. “Based Upon” Refers to the Gravamen of the Complaint
92
OBB reads the Court’s holding in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson to
mean the “based upon” requirement refers to “the gravamen of the
93
complaint.” Therefore, Sachs’s claim should be dismissed because it
94
is based upon her accident in Austria, not the ticket sale. OBB claims
that Sachs’s case is analogous to Nelson. In Nelson, the plaintiff
asserted the commercial-activity exception applied to his action
regarding his arrest, beating, and torture by foreign police because it
95
resulted from a contract he signed in the United States. The Court
held that, “[w]hile [the contract] led to the conduct that eventually
96
injured the [him], [it is] not the basis for [his] suit.” By this logic,
although Sachs’s ticket purchase may have led to the injuries she
97
sustained, it “is not the basis for her suit.” Her injuries are “based
98
upon” her activity on the train platform in Austria.
According to OBB, if Sachs’s claim were upheld, foreign
sovereigns would be exposed to the artful pleading the Court sought
99
to avoid in Nelson. The Court, in Nelson, refused “[t]o give
jurisdictional significance to this feint of language” because it “would
effectively thwart the Act’s manifest purpose to codify the restrictive
100
theory of foreign sovereign immunity.” OBB argues that if an online
ticket sale in the United States is a basis for tort claims regarding
88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 28–38.
89. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).
90. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 38–64.
91. Id. at 64.
92. 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
93. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 29 (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358).
94. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4, OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S.
July 28, 2015).
95. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358.
96. Id.
97. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 32.
98. Id.
99. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363.
100. Id.
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incidents occurring outside of the United States, then artful pleading
101
will blur clear legal lines. OBB contends that Sachs’s claim “is
merely a semantic ploy” to give her action some semblance of
102
legitimacy.
OBB rejects Sachs’s “one-element” test—under which “based
103
upon” refers to just one element of the plaintiff’s claim —because it
would treat foreign sovereigns like private parties, contrary to the
104
purpose of FSIA. Although, according to the restrictive theory,
sovereigns should be treated like private parties when they perform
private actions, “[i]t does not mean that foreign states and private
105
parties are treated alike for all purposes.”
2. Attribution is Determined by § 1603(b) or Bancec
Even if the Court finds Sachs’s claim is based upon the ticket sale,
106
OBB argues that RPE’s actions cannot be imputed to it. OBB
asserts that because FSIA controls with respect to foreign sovereign
107
immunity, the Act’s definitions determine attribution.
Because FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
108
foreign state,” OBB argues that the definition of “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state” leaves no room for common law
109
agents. Under this definition, an agency exists if it is:
a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise . . . an organ of a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of
whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof . . . [and] neither a citizen of a
State of the United States . . . , nor created under the laws of any
110
third country.

RPE does not satisfy the definition of an agency under § 1603(b).
OBB argues that because the plain language of the statute controls,

101. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 35.
102. Id.
103. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 37–51. See infra Section IV.B.1 for a full
discussion of the one-element test.
104. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 10–12.
105. Id. at 11.
106. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 38.
107. Id. at 25–26.
108. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (quoting Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)).
109. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 40• 41.
110. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).
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RPE is not an agency of Austria, and therefore its actions cannot be
attributed to OBB.
Alternatively, OBB argues that Bancec’s two-pronged test should
111
apply. If the Court is to look outside FSIA, then this “inquiry should
be dictated by the precepts of the restrictive theory of [foreign
112
sovereign immunity] that Congress sought to codify.” OBB does not
113
have any control over RPE. The only possible relationship between
OBB and RPE may be as “a subagent of an unidentified general sales
114
agent accredited by the Eurail Group, not OBB itself.” And even
then, the Eurail Group is comprised of thirty European rail services,
so it can hardly be said that OBB exercised sufficient control over the
115
Eurail Group to establish liability. Furthermore, OBB did not create
this relationship in order to “work fraud or injustice”; in fact, “there
[is] no evidence that OBB even knew RPE existed prior to the filing
116
of this suit.”
Finally, OBB argues that the Ninth Circuit’s holding would lead to
an inconsistent application of jurisdiction between foreign sovereigns
117
and foreign private parties. The Court held in Daimler AG v.
118
Bauman that federal courts could not assert general personal
jurisdiction over a foreign company unless “that corporation’s
affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to
119
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” However, under
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case, a court may assert jurisdiction
over a foreign state if there is a connection between it and another
120
company that markets in the United States. If the Ninth Circuit’s
holding persists, it “would create the untenable anomaly that it is
easier for a plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction in the courts of the United
121
States over a foreign state than a foreign corporation.”
111. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 50–55.
112. Id. at 50.
113. Id. at 53 (“[T]here is no evidence, or even allegation, that OBB exercised any degree of
direction or control, or element of control, over RPE.”).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 61–64.
118. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
119. Id. at 761 (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
120. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 61 (“A foreign-state owned common carrier,
such as a railway or airline, engages in commercial activity in the United States when it sells
tickets in the United States through a travel agent.”) (quoting Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737
F.2d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
121. Id. at 63.
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B. Sachs’s Arguments
Sachs contends that FSIA’s “based upon” requirement is satisfied
either when a general “course of conduct” results in substantial
122
contact with the United States, or when one element of a claim has
123
substantial contact with the United States. Sachs also asserts that
common law agency principles require that RPE’s ticket sale be
124
attributed to OBB, satisfying the definition of “commercial activity.”
1. “Based Upon” Refers to a General Course of Conduct or One
Element of the Action
According to Sachs, the term “activity” in “commercial activity”
means the Court should focus on the entire enterprise of OBB, not
125
just the specific act at issue. Sachs distinguishes the first clause of
the commercial-activity exception, which is at issue here, with its sister
clauses. The first clause refers to “based upon a commercial activity,”
whereas the latter two are “based upon an act” related to commercial
126
activity. Furthermore, “commercial activity” is defined as “a regular
127
course of commercial conduct.” Therefore, if this regular course of
commercial conduct has a substantial contact with the United States,
128
it falls under the commercial-activity exception.
Moreover, because commercial activity must have a “substantial
contact with the United States, there is already a requirement for
some geographical nexus in the first clause of the commercial-activity
129
exception.”
If “based upon” also included a geographical
requirement, then “the statute’s ‘substantial contact’ requirement
130
would become superfluous.”
Even if the Court rejects Sachs’s “general course of conduct”
argument, she also claims that Saudi Arabia v. Nelson requires only
that the commercial act “constitut[e] one element of the plaintiff’s

122. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 24–36.
123. Id. at 37–51.
124. Id. at 12–23.
125. Id. at 24.
126. Id.
127. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012).
128. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 25; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (“A ‘commercial
activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state’ means commercial activity carried on
by such state and having substantial contact with the United States.”).
129. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 29.
130. Id.
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131

action.” In Nelson, the Court held that “based upon” referred to
“those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to
132
relief under his theory of the case.” In that case, none of the
elements of Nelson’s claims stemmed from the commercial activity of
his employment contract, and therefore the Court found that his
133
action did not satisfy the “based upon” requirement. Although
Sachs concedes that Nelson did not explicitly adopt the one-element
134
test, the Court did not base its holding on OBB’s gravamen test.
Sachs argues that, in order to establish a clear, bright-line rule,
135
“based upon” should be read as a one-element test. Sachs contends
136
that OBB’s gravamen test is unclear. If courts use the gravamen test,
judges would have to “concoct an approach for determining the ‘gist
137
or essence’ of the lawsuit, with no clear guideposts at hand.”
Whereas, under the one-element test, Sachs’s claim is based upon the
ticket sale because it constitutes the duty element of her claim.
2. Attribution is Determined by the Common Law of Agency
Sachs argues that RPE’s ticket sale is attributable to OBB under
138
common law principles of agency. Sachs rejects OBB’s contention
that FSIA’s definition of “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”
exclusively governs the relationship between RPE and OBB. FSIA is
the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction over a foreign state; it does not
139
determine the entire inquiry of an exception’s meaning. Thus, a
plaintiff need only assert that one of the FSIA exceptions applies to
140
the case, not that FSIA controls all questions relating to the case.
Furthermore, FSIA is meant to codify the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, which “is designed to treat foreign states like
private actors when such states operate as ‘every day participants’ in
131. Id. at 37 (citing Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
132. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993).
133. Id. at 358.
134. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 39.
135. Id. at 40–41.
136. Id. at 43–44.
137. Id. at 44. In response, OBB asserts that the one-element test would also complicate
matters because it would “requir[e] courts to analyze the elements of each state law claim.”
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 94, at 13.
138. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 12–23. In her brief, Sachs addressed the
attribution issue first and then turned to the “based upon” requirement because she believes
“once one properly focuses on the overall commercial activity involved, the precise meaning of
‘based upon’ is irrelevant here.” Id. at 27.
139. Id. at 14 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 473–78 (2003)).
140. Id.
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141

the marketplace.” Private actors would be subject to the common
law principles of agency. Therefore, the common law on agency should
apply to foreign sovereigns if they are liable under a FSIA
142
exception. If foreign states decide to use agents, then “attributing
the agents’ actions to the states ensures that all commercial actors in
143
this country are treated alike.”
V. ANALYSIS
Although Sachs is likely to prevail in asserting that the “based
upon” requirement should be construed according to the one-element
test, RPE’s ticket sale should not be attributed to OBB. Under the
Bancec test, RPE’s ticket sale is not OBB’s action.
At the outset the parties disagree as to the order of the issues.
144
OBB claims that the “based upon” inquiry is the first question, but
145
Sachs asserts that attribution should be considered first. The Court
should first decide the “based upon” inquiry. This order is plainly part
of the logic of Saudi Arabia v. Nelson: “We begin our analysis by
identifying the particular conduct on which the Nelsons’ action is
146
‘based’ for purposes of the Act.” The Court should address the
issues in this same order. If the Court determines that Sachs’s action is
not “based upon” a commercial activity, the attribution question is
irrelevant because even if RPE’s activity is attributable, it cannot
trigger an exception to foreign sovereign immunity.
A. Mincing Words: The “Based Upon” Requirement of the
Commercial-Activity Exception
Sachs will likely prevail as to the meaning of “based upon” with
her one-element test applied on a claim-by-claim basis under Nelson.
Sachs’s course of conduct theory is erroneous. Although Sachs
offers a clever way of reading the statute by parsing the distinctions
between “activity” and “act” with the clauses of the subsection of the
statute, her claim undermines the restrictive theory of sovereign
141. Id. at 15 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 at 7 (1976)).
142. Id.
143. Id..
144. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 28 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349,
356–57 (1993)).
145. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 27; but see Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 6, OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs, No. 13-1067 (U.S.
Apr. 24, 2015) (addressing the attribution question before the “based upon” question).
146. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356 (1993).
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immunity. The restrictive theory allows for exceptions to sovereign
immunity in “cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly commercial
147
acts.” Expanding “commercial activity” to include general conduct
would allow plaintiffs to file actions with tenuous connections to the
United States, in direct conflict with the essential presumption that a
148
foreign state is immune from suit.
149
For example, in Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France the
plaintiff sued a foreign airline after one of its employees accidentally
ran over his foot while on the job. Santos argued that his claim was
150
based on a lease between Air France and his employer. The court
found that his action was not based on a commercial activity because
the contract had nothing to do with his claim. “[I]f it had been [any
other airline’s] employee who had been driving, Santos would [have
sued] one of those airlines instead” regardless of whether there was a
151
lease or not. Under Sachs’s broad theory, however, Santos’s claim
would stem simply from Air France’s commercial activity of operating
as an airline. Even though his claim has nothing to do with being a
passenger on an airline, and therefore he has no common carrier
relationship with Air France, Santos could bring suit against a foreign
instrumentality simply because the sovereign chose to operate an
airline. This undermines the narrow view of the restrictive theory.
Sachs is nonetheless correct that the Court should apply the oneelement test for the “based upon” requirement, as several circuit
152
courts have already held. OBB claims that the gravamen test is
153
superior because it would minimize the dangers of artful pleading,
but the one-element test avoids this artful pleading concern. By
asserting that an element of a claim is based upon a commercial
activity in the United States, a plaintiff must directly connect the
action to the United States. The only risk of artful pleading Sachs’s
one-element test presents is that if the plaintiff can assert one element
of one claim, then the entire action would be based upon a

147. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
148. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 355.
149. 934 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1991).
150. Id. at 892.
151. Id.
152. Kirkham v. Société Air France, 429 F.3d 288, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Santos v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1991); Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of
Civil Aviation of China, 822 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1987).
153. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 35 (citing Nelson, 507 U.S. at 363).
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154

commercial activity. However, the Ninth Circuit went through a
155
claim-by-claim analysis of Sachs’s lawsuit. Therefore, those claims
lacking substantial contact with the United States would be dismissed.
Considering this, the Court should hold not only that the one-element
test is correct, but also that it should be performed on a claim-byclaim basis.
B. It’s (Not Really) Complicated: Bancec, FSIA, and the Relationship
of OBB and RPE
Although Sachs should succeed on the “based upon” issue, OBB
correctly asserts that the Bancec two-pronged test should apply.
OBB errs with its first argument that FSIA directly controls the
156
attribution issue. FSIA “indisputably governs the determination of
157
whether a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity,” not if
158
actions are attributable to it.
In fact, OBB cites to cases that undercut its own argument, such as
159
160
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson and Samantar v. Yousuf. In Dole, the
plaintiffs were not trying to attribute liability to a foreign sovereign;
they wanted to attribute their actions to the sovereign to seek
161
immunity. Similarly, in Samantar, the former Prime Minister of
Somalia was seeking foreign sovereign immunity under the “agency or
162
instrumentality of a foreign state” definition in § 1603(b). The Court
used the statutory language in both cases because defendants were
trying to achieve sovereign immunity, not because plaintiffs wanted to
attribute an agent’s actions in order to exempt defendants from
immunity.
On the other hand, Sachs’s assertion that common law agency
rules apply to this case is also incorrect. Sachs argues that “FSIA is
designed to treat foreign states like private actors when such states
163
operate as ‘every day participants’ in the marketplace.” This

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
(1976)).

Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 49.
Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 599–602 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 39.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 313 (2010).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 18.
538 U.S. 468 (2003).
560 U.S. 305 (2010).
Dole, 538 U.S. at 471.
Samantar, 560 U.S. at 314–15.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 15 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487 at 7
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argument puts the cart before the horse. The foreign sovereign is only
treated like a private actor when it falls under one of the FSIA
exceptions. Sachs would have the Court treat a foreign sovereign like
a private actor in order to reach the FSIA exception. Common law
principles could only possibly apply if the foreign sovereign is already
liable under an FSIA exception. Sachs cannot use the restrictive
theory in order to create a loophole in FSIA.
The Court should use the Bancec two-pronged test to determine
attribution under FSIA because that case provides a clear rule for
determining when a foreign sovereign is clearly acting through an
agent. Bancec correctly declares that “government instrumentalities
established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their
164
sovereign should normally be treated as such.” Furthermore, the
first prong of Bancec focuses on the control the foreign sovereign
165
exerts over the entity. This allows for liability when the foreign
sovereign is clearly acting through the agent. Nonetheless, it also
mitigates this liability; a foreign sovereign who has no control over an
entity cannot direct the entity to act on its behalf. If there is control
under Bancec, then the foreign sovereign has clearly assented to the
relationship with the entity.
The present case exemplifies why Bancec’s test is the most
consistent with FSIA’s purpose. The Ninth Circuit attributed RPE’s
166
ticket sale to OBB even though OBB had no control over RPE. It is
absurd to attribute RPE’s commercial activity to OBB. RPE is a
travel agent working for the Eurail Group, of which OBB is a
167
member, along with nearly thirty other rail services. Although the
Eurail Group’s actions arguably can be attributed to OBB because
OBB has some control over that group, the same cannot be said for
RPE. RPE operates independently of both OBB and the Eurail
Group. RPE sells train tickets to American citizens not just for OBB
but for other Eurail Group members. OBB is simply too many
degrees removed from the American vendor for the commercialactivity exception to reasonably apply in this case.
The second prong of Bancec addresses Sachs’s concern that
without common law agency principles, foreign states could use non-

164.
165.
166.
167.

Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626 (1983).
Id. at 630.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 53.
Id. at 54.
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attributable entities to operate in the United States without fear of
168
liability. If a foreign sovereign is abusing the corporate structure in
order to “work fraud or injustice” and circumvent otherwise
applicable liability, the Court should ignore the corporate structure.
169
Indeed, this was the exact outcome of Bancec.
Finally, in comparing the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the Court’s
recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, OBB presents a
particularly compelling case to the Court in light of international
170
comity. Comity has been a concern of the Court since The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon. The Court disfavors getting involved in
foreign policy issues, and its decision in Daimler directly refers to this
171
concern. In Daimler, the Court held that foreign private companies
could not be subject to general personal jurisdiction unless the
entity’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’
172
as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” The same
concern for comity should influence the Court’s determination of
foreign sovereign immunity. If private companies cannot be held
under personal jurisdiction for their particular activities in the United
States, it seems completely anomalous to hold foreign sovereigns
liable for activities performed by third-party entities over which the
173
state has no control.
CONCLUSION
Foreign sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that treads a fine
line between law and politics. At one point, it was almost exclusively
political; the United States would make foreign sovereign immunity
174
decisions purely on foreign policy grounds. Today, FSIA and the
restrictive theory have pushed the decision into the judicial realm,
with a continued emphasis on the importance of international comity.
Due to the deep connection between the law and foreign affairs, legal
questions regarding the scope of FSIA risk encroaching on the policy
side of the law. The Court should keep this frame of reference in mind
when it decides this case. It should conclude that the “based upon”
168. Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at 15.
169. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 632.
170. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
171. Id. 763.
172. Id. at 761 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
173. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 63.
174. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (recounting the
history of the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine).
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requirement is governed by the one-element test under Saudi Arabia
v. Nelson on a claim-by-claim basis, but that Bancec should control the
determination of attribution of a non-sovereign entity’s actions to a
foreign sovereign.

